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Forthcoming in Alexander Tsesis, ed., Promises of Liberty:  Thirteenth Amendment 
Abolitionism and Its Contemporary Vitality, Columbia University Press, 2010. 
 
 






The longer I live the more I see that I am never wrong about anything, and that all the 
pains I have so humbly taken to verify my notions have only wasted my time. 
 





 Dawn Johnsen, as this is written the nominee to head the Office of Legal 
Counsel,
2
 wrote an amicus brief which argued in passing that restrictions on abortion “are 
disturbingly suggestive of involuntary servitude, prohibited by the Thirteenth 
Amendment, in that forced pregnancy requires a woman to provide continuous physical 
service to the fetus in order to further the state's asserted interest. Indeed, the actual 
process of delivery demands work of the most intense and physical kind: labor of 12 or 
more grueling hours of contractions is not uncommon.”  After she was nominated as 
OLC head, Senator Arlen Specter declared that this passage raised “real questions in my 
mind about her competency to handle this important job.”  The argument is, “to say 
startling would be a mild characterization,” said Specter.  “It seems to me pretty hard to 
say that that’s an arguable legal position.”3 
 Senator Specter misunderstood Johnsen’s position.  To say that one thing is 
“disturbingly suggestive” of another is hardly the same as saying that it is identical to that 
other thing.  Johnsen made this point to support her Fourteenth Amendment claim, by 
showing the serious nature of the liberty interest that is at stake.  The brief does not argue 
that the state laws violate the Thirteenth Amendment.  She quickly made clear in 
subsequent statements that she had made no Thirteenth Amendment argument. 
 If there was any point of consensus that came out of this sorry episode, it was that 
if you want to be taken seriously, you had better not make a Thirteenth Amendment 
                                                 
1
 Bernard Shaw, letter to H.G. Wells, 7 December 1916, in Collected Letters, 1911-1925, at 439 (Dan H. 
Laurence ed. 1985). 
2
 As this is written, in November  2009, Johnsen’s confirmation remains in doubt, and Senator Specter, who 
recently became a Democrat, remains opposed to her nomination. 
3
 Specter Remarks on Qualifications of Nominee to Head DOJ Office of Legal Counsel, Congressional 
Documents and Publications, Mar. 19, 2009.  Senator Specter also, very unfortunately, cited me as 
authority for the position that Johnsen had made a Thirteenth Amendment argument.  This was based on a 
misreading both of my article and Johnsen’s brief.  See Andrew Koppelman, Lying About Dawn Johnsen, 
available at http://balkin.blogspot.com/2009/04/lying-about-dawn-johnsen.html (visited April 3, 2009). 
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argument on behalf of abortion.  That is beyond the pale.  Senator Specter and his 
supporters
4
 also made it clear that they regarded the position as so clearly wrong that it 
was not necessary to even give a hint as to what was wrong with it.  In this they 
continued a long tradition of casual dismissal.  It is not even clear that they understand 
the argument. 
 Most of the articles in this book, I am sure, break new ground, deploying the 
Thirteenth Amendment in new and creative ways.  This is not one of them.  I am going to 
restate an argument I made long ago, in my first article (not counting my law journal 
Note), written in law school and published while I was still a graduate student.
5
  I’m 
going to then consider how the work was received, offer some amendments to the 
argument, and conclude with some reflections on how, perhaps, it can have more 
influence in the future. 
  
I.  The basic argument 
 
 The Thirteenth Amendment reads as follows: 
  1.  Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a 
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, 
shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their 
jurisdiction. 
  2.  Congress shall have the power to enforce this article by 
appropriate legislation. 
 My claim is that the amendment is violated by laws that prohibit abortion.  When 
women are compelled to carry and bear children, they are subjected to "involuntary 
servitude" in violation of the amendment.  Abortion prohibitions violate the 
Amendment's guarantee of personal liberty, because forced pregnancy and childbirth, by 
compelling the woman to serve the fetus, creates "that control by which the personal 
service of one man [sic] is disposed of or coerced for another's benefit which is the 
essence of involuntary servitude."
6
  Such laws violate the amendment's guarantee of 
equality, because forcing women to be mothers makes them into a servant caste, a group 
which, by virtue of a status of birth, is held subject to a special duty to serve others and 
not themselves. 
 This argument makes available two responses to the standard defense of such 
prohibitions, the claim that the fetus is a person.  The first is that even if this is so, its 
right to the continued aid of the woman does not follow.  As Judith Jarvis Thomson 
observes, "having a right to life does not guarantee having either a right to be given the 
use of or a right to be allowed continued use of another person's body -- even if one needs 
                                                 
4
 The most prominent of these was the National Review Online columnist Andrew McCarthy, who calls the 
argument “lunatic” and “farcical,” but whose analysis does not proceed beyond the exuberant application of 
adjectives.  See Andrew McCarthy, “Lawyer’s Lawyer, Radical’s Radical,” National Review Online, 
March 9, 2009. 
 
5
 Andrew Koppelman, Forced Labor:  A Thirteenth Amendment Defense of Abortion, 84 Nw. U. L. Rev. 
480 (1990).   
6
 Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 241 (1911). 
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it for life itself."
7
  Giving fetuses a legal right to the continued use of their mothers' 
bodies would be precisely what the Thirteenth Amendment forbids.  The second response 
is that since abortion prohibitions infringe on the fundamental right to be free of 
involuntary servitude, the burden is on the state to show that the violation of this right is 
justified.  Since the thesis that the fetus is, or should at least be considered, a person 
seems impossible to prove (or to refute), this is a burden that the state cannot carry.  If we 
are not certain that the fetus is a person, then the mere possibility that it might be is not 
enough to justify violating women's Thirteenth Amendment rights by forcing them to be 
mothers. 
 This is not a purely textual argument.  It builds heavily on the Thirteenth 
Amendment caselaw – caselaw that is likely to be unfamiliar to many readers.  The 
unfamiliarity presents a difficulty that I did not see when I wrote the original article.  At 
that time, I naively believed what I had been taught in law school:  that, if caselaw has 
been laid down by the Supreme Court, repeatedly followed, and never overruled, then it 
can be relied on as a source of law.  The reality isn’t that simple.  But first, let me 
describe the argument. 
 Most of the jurisprudence surrounding the amendment concerns Congress' power 
under the second section,
8
 but I want to begin by focusing on the first, which is self-
executing.
9
  Although primarily directed against the slavery of the antebellum South, the 
amendment is broader in scope, as the Court held when it first considered the amendment 
in the Slaughter House Cases. 
 Undoubtedly while negro slavery alone was in the mind of the Congress 
which proposed the thirteenth article, it forbids any other kind of slavery, 
now or hereafter.  If Mexican peonage or the Chinese coolie labor system 
shall develop slavery of the Mexican or Chinese race within our territory, 
this amendment may safely be trusted to make it void.
10
 
                                                 
7
 Judith Jarvis Thomson, A Defense of Abortion, 1 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 47, 56 (1971).  
8
 The major cases are United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1883) (invalidating conspiracy section of 1871 
Ku Klux Klan Act); the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) (invalidating 1875 Civil Rights Act's ban on 
racial discrimination in public accommodations); Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207 (1905) (sustaining 
anti-peonage statute); Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1 (1906) (invalidating law against conspiracies to 
deprive blacks of their rights); and Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968) (overruling Hodges, 
and holding that Congress has broad power to identify and eliminate "badges of slavery").  Two useful 
general histories of Thirteenth Amendment jurisprudence are G. Sidney Buchanan, The Quest for Freedom:  
A Legal History of the Thirteenth Amendment (1976), and Howard D. Hamilton, The Legislative & 
Judicial History of the Thirteenth Amendment, 9 Nat’l B.J. 26 (1951). 
9
 The Court's late 20th century decisions have included dicta to the effect that the Court has not yet decided 
whether the self-executing provision did more than free the slaves.  See City of Memphis v. Greene, 451 
U.S. 100, 125-6 (1981); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 439 (1968); General Building 
Contractors Assn. v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 390 n.17 (1982).  This is not accurate.  In its early 
twentieth century cases invalidating laws that effectively imposed peonage, the Court consistently held 
those laws to be in conflict with both the Thirteenth Amendment and the federal statutes authorized by it.  
Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 239, 245 (1911): United States v. Reynolds, 235 U.S. 133, 150 (1914); 
Taylor v. Georgia, 315 U.S. 25, 31 (1942); Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4, 25 (1944). 
10
 Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 72 (1873). 
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The Court also said that "the word servitude is of larger meaning than slavery, as the 
latter is popularly understood in this country . . . . It was very well understood that . . . the 
purpose of the article might have been evaded, if only the word slavery had been used."
11
  
 What then, does the amendment protect?  I said at the outset that the amendment 
is concerned with both liberty and equality.  Each of these concerns is reflected in a 
different body of case law.  Consider them in turn. 
 
A.  Liberty 
 
 The Court has explained that “involuntary servitude” refers to "the control of the 
labor and services of one man for the benefit of another, and the absence of a legal right 
to the disposal of his own person, property and services;"
12
 "a condition of enforced 
compulsory service of one to another,"
13
 "that control by which the personal service of 
one man is disposed of or coerced for another's benefit which is the essence of 
involuntary servitude."
14
   
 Thus defined, it  follows that "involuntary servitude" includes coerced pregnancy.  
The pregnant woman may not serve at the fetus' command -- it is the state that, by 
outlawing abortion, supplies the element of coercion
15
 -- but she is serving involuntarily 
for the fetus' benefit, and this is what the Court has said that the amendment forbids.  If 
citizens may not be forced to surrender control of their persons and services, then 
women's persons may not be invaded and their services may not be coerced for the 
benefit of fetuses.  It is as simple as that.  The injury inflicted on women by forced 
motherhood is lesser in degree than that inflicted on blacks by antebellum slavery, since 
it is temporary and involves less than total control over the body, but it is the same kind 
of injury.  When abortion is outlawed, the pregnant woman must serve the fetus, and that 
servitude is involuntary.   
 Some of those to whom I've made this argument have responded less with 
skepticism than with horror.  They take it to be a libel on motherhood, which far from 
being like slavery is an exhilarating, awe-inspiring and joyous experience.
16
  It may not 
be out of place, therefore, to address this concern at the outset.  The objection gathers 
whatever force it has by focusing on the experience of women who want to be mothers.  
But the Thirteenth Amendment doesn't apply to them.  The servitude it is concerned with 




 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 542 (1896) (emphases added). 
13
 Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1, 16 (1906). 
14
 Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 241 (1911). 
15
 The same is, of course, true of any system of slavery sanctioned by positive law, such as that of the 
antebellum South:  the master did not need to resort to self-help to control his slaves, but could rely on the 
authorities to come to his assistance if necessary. 
16
 The argument is denounced as “bizarre” on this basis in Wendy Wright, U.N. Meeting on Women Ends 
in Chaos, Mar. 20, 2003, Concerned Women for America website, 
http://www.cwfa.org/articles/3596/CWA/nation/index.htm (visited May 31, 2007). 
 5 
is involuntary.  The distinction between wanted and unwanted pregnancy is like the 
difference between wanted and unwanted sex.  Can rape be defended on the grounds that 
sex is an exhilarating, awe-inspiring, joyous experience?  Are arguments that focus on the 
degrading and violative aspects of rape a libel on sex?  Plantation slavery cannot be 
justified on the grounds that many people find gardening deeply satisfying. 
 Women differ from men in that the services they are capable of performing 
include the production of human beings.  The Thirteenth Amendment, however, draws no 
distinction between the powers of a man's back and arms and those of a woman's uterus.  
Both, according to the amendment, belong to the individual who possesses them and 
cannot be made subject to the command or benefit of another.  Indeed, the recent advent 
of "surrogate motherhood" has shown that women's reproductive powers are as capable 
as any other of being transacted for in the marketplace, a marketplace that the Thirteenth 
Amendment establishes as "a system of completely free and voluntary labor throughout 
the United States."
17
   
 The compulsion of women to use those reproductive powers for purposes not their 
own is incompatible with the amendment's strong declaration of universal personal 
liberty.  As the second Justice Harlan observed, the acts of the Reconstruction Congress 
reflected "the individualistic ethic of their time, which emphasized personal freedom and 
embodied a distaste for governmental interference which was soon to culminate in the era 
of laissez-faire. . . . [M]ost of these men would have regarded it as a great intrusion on 
individual liberty for the Government to take from a man [sic] the power to refuse for 
personal reasons to enter into a purely private transaction . . . ."
18
  Doubtless these men's 
vision of liberty did not extend to women's control over their childbearing capacities.
19
  
But the framers did enact that vision in broad language whose scope did not exclude 
women,
20
 and there is no principled reason for excluding women from it today.
21
  
                                                 
17
 Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4, 17 (1944); cf. Bailey, 219 U.S. at 245. 
18
 Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 473-74 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
19
 Opponents of the amendment did, however, express fears about its radical egalitarianism which went 
unanswered by its proponents.  See, e.g., Cong. Globe, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1488 (1864) (remarks of Sen. 
Howard) ("I suppose before the law a woman would be equal to a man, would be as free as a man.  A wife 
would be equal to her husband and as free as her husband before the law."); Cong. Globe, 38th Cong., 2nd 
Sess. 215 (1865) (remarks of Rep. White) ("A husband has a right of property in the service of his wife; he 
has the right to the management of his household affairs. . . . All of these rights rest upon the same basis as 
a man's right of property in the service of slaves."). 
20
 Unlike, for example, the suffrage provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment.  See U.S. Const., Amend. 
XIV, Sec. 2 (reducing Congressional representation of a state if "the right to vote . . . is denied to any of the 
male inhabitants of such State"). 
21
 Whatever reasons justify the extension of Fourteenth Amendment rights to women apply, mutatis 
mutandis, to the Thirteenth Amendment as well.  That the Thirteenth Amendment is not confined to 
injuries to blacks, or even to those based on race, was suggested by the Court in Griffin v. Breckenridge, 
403 U.S. 88 (1971), which held that the Ku Klux Klan act, outlawing private conspiracies to deprive any 
class of persons of their constitutional rights, was a valid exercise of Congress' Thirteenth Amendment 
powers.  In order to avoid creating a general federal tort law, the Court held that the mental element 
required for a violation of the statute was "some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously 
discriminatory animus."  Id. at 102 (emphasis added).  In a footnote, the Court added that "[w]e need not 
 6 
 The pun on the word "labor" should not distract your attention from the fact that 
when a woman is forced against her will to carry a child to term, control over her body 
and its (re)productive capacities is seized from her and directed to a purpose not her own.  
As Ellen Willis observes, "[t]here is no way a pregnant woman can passively let the fetus 
live; she must create and nurture it with her own body, in a symbiosis that is often 
difficult, sometimes dangerous, always uniquely intimate."
22
  If there is a difficulty here, 
it seems to stem from the fact that work is paradigmatically thought of as what men do; 
what women traditionally do is not called work ("my wife doesn't work") except perhaps 
to the extent that it is performed with the same limbs and muscles that men possess.  But 
what would we call any activity that demanded that a man, in order to produce a tangible 
result, endure constant exhaustion, loss of appetite, vomiting, sleeplessness, bloatedness, 
soreness, swelling, uncontrollable mood swings and, ultimately, hours of agony, often 
followed by deep depression?
23
  (Perhaps one ought also to include the burden of raising 




                                                                                                                                                 
decide, given the facts of this case, whether a conspiracy motivated by invidiously discriminatory intent 
other than racial bias would be actionable."  Id. at 102 n.9.  A sex discrimination claim under the statute 
was held actionable in Pendrell v. Chatham College, 370 F.Supp. 494 (W.D. Pa. 1974), in which a college 
professor alleged a conspiracy to terminate her employment because of, inter alia, her sex.  While the court 
did not cite the Thirteenth Amendment as the constitutional authority for the statute's regulation of private 
conduct, "no other construction reasonably explains the court's decision," since the facts involved neither 
state action nor interstate travel.  G. Buchanan, supra, at 171. 
22
 Ellen Willis, Abortion:  Is a Woman a Person?, in Powers of Desire:  The Politics of Sexuality 471, 473 
(Ann Snitow, Christine Stansell & Sharon Thompson eds. 1983).  Cf. Robert Goldstein, Mother-Love and 
Abortion (1988); Motion for Leave to File Brief Amici Curiae on Behalf of Organizations [California 
Committee to Legalize Abortion, et al.] and Named Women in Support of Appellants in Each Case, and 
Brief Amici Curiae, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (No. 70-18) at 23-24: 
Even if the life support services which the woman's body brings into performance for sustenance 
of the fetus are largely automatic and non-voluntary, they are not non-services or non-actions.  
They are, according to medical experts, arduous, tiring, and obstructive of other work.  The 
contractions of childbirth are literally "labor."  They are the most strenuous work of which the 
human body is capable. 
23
 This list is considerably abbreviated; the details could (and do, see Donald Regan, Rewriting Roe v. 
Wade, 77 Mich. L. Rev. 1569, 1579-82 (1979) fill pages. 
24
 The coercion involved here is nicely described by Jed Rubenfeld: 
[F]rom a moral or political view, it seems hardly acceptable to insist that a woman remains 
perfectly "free" to do what now would contradict her most elemental feelings of obligation to the 
child that she has been compelled to bear.  The anti-abortionist cannot defend abortion laws on the 
basis of a woman's abstract freedom to give up the child when the real moral and practical 
constraints upon this decision have been created by the operation of the very laws in question. 
The Right of Privacy, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 737, 790 n.204 (1989).  These constraints would be exacerbated if 
abortion were illegal and if the laws against it were vigorously enforced (as they were not before Roe, see 
Hyman Rodman, Betty Sarvis, & Joy Bonar, The Abortion Question 23-24 (1987)), since if all pregnancies 
now aborted were to come to term, the pool of potential adoptive parents would be exhausted in less than a 
year.  Goldstein, supra, at 179-90.  In such a world, women who had been forced to bear children would 
 7 
 The germinal case construing the self-executing force of the Thirteenth 
Amendment is Bailey v. Alabama.
25
  The case came to the Supreme Court as an appeal 
from a criminal conviction for fraud.  Bailey, a black laborer, had accepted a $15 advance 
for signing a contract in which he agreed to work for a landholding corporation, the 
Riverside Company, for a year.  Under the contract, he would earn $12 a month, of which 
$1.25 would be deducted each month to repay the $15 advance.  After about a month, 
Bailey left the job and refused to return to it.  He was then prosecuted for defrauding the 
Riverside Company of $15, convicted, and sentenced to 136 days of hard labor.  While 
there was no evidence that he had intended to defraud the company, an Alabama statute 
provided that if one breached a service contract without refunding the money paid, fraud 
would be presumed.  Under state rules of evidence, the accused was not permitted to 
testify about his intentions for the purpose of rebutting the presumption. 
 In reversing the conviction, Justice Hughes declared that "[w]ithout imputing any 
actual motive to oppress, we must consider the natural operation of the statute here in 
question, and it is apparent that it furnishes a convenient instrument for the coercion 
which the Constitution . . . forbid[s]."
26
  The Thirteenth Amendment, he concluded, "does 
not permit slavery or involuntary servitude to be established or maintained through the 
operation of the criminal law by making it a crime to refuse to submit to the one or to 
render the service which would constitute the other."
27
 
 Bailey's definition of involuntary servitude as "that control by which the personal 
service of one man is disposed of or coerced for another's benefit"
28
 encompasses the 
burden imposed on women by laws against abortion, since the "natural operation" of a 
statute prohibiting abortion is to make it a crime for a woman to refuse to render service 
to a fetus.  Even had the decision been differently worded, any decision in Bailey's favor 
would a fortiori protect the woman who seeks to abort, since the servitude to which 
                                                                                                                                                 
know that the alternative to raising them themselves would be to consign them to state institutions.  Such a 
choice is already faced by mothers of minority or handicapped children, whose chances of adoption are 
much smaller than other children’s.  Id. at 182; U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services, Children’s 
Bureau, Administration for Children and Families, Children of Color in the Child Welfare System:  
Perspectives From the Child Welfare Community 8 (Dec. 2003), available at 
http://www.childwelfare.gov/pubs/otherpubs/children/children.pdf (visited Dec. 12, 2007)(Caucasian 
children are five times as likely to be adopted as children from other groups); Claire Baker, Disabled 
Children’s Experience of Permanency in the Looked After System, 37 Brit. J. Soc. Work 1173 (2007).  
25
 219 U.S. 219 (1911). 
26
 Id. at 244-45. 
27
 Id. at 244.  For the history of the Bailey case, see Benno Schmidt, The Peonage Cases:  The Supreme 
Court and the "Wheel of Servitude", in Alexander Bickel & Benno Schmidt, The Judiciary and Responsible 
Government, 1910-21, ch. 9 (1984).  The case is likely to be unfamiliar to many readers.  "The Peonage 
Cases are a largely forgotten footnote in constitutional law, and not even that in the law of contracts."  Id. at 
906.  But this is not because the cases have lost any of their force.  Rather, "the free-labor principle of the 
Peonage Cases has become thoroughly embedded in the bedrock of our constitutional and contract law," id. 
at 822, so that no litigant has challenged it in many years.  The case for abortion rights is strengthened, not 
weakened, by relying on a principle so fundamental that it is never questioned. 
28
 219 U.S. at 241. 
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Bailey was subjected was considerably less -- less taxing, less intrusive, and less total in 
its probable impact on the course of his whole life -- than that which forced pregnancy 
imposes on her. 
 Bailey also provides an answer to those who would dispute that the servitude is 
involuntary.  Some opponents of abortion think that women should be considered to 
assume the risk of pregnancy when they consent to have sex.
29
  Even if women did 
deliberately assume such a risk, Bailey holds that the right to personal liberty guaranteed 
by the Thirteenth Amendment is inalienable.   
 The full intent of the constitutional provision could be defeated with 
obvious facility if, through the guise of contracts under which advances 
had been made, debtors could be held to compulsory service.  It is the 
compulsion of the service that the statute [which enforces the amendment] 
inhibits, for when that occurs the condition of servitude is created, which 




So even if the woman is stipulated to have consented to the risk of pregnancy, that does 
not permit the state to force her to remain pregnant.  Rather, the Court has announced a 
principle of broad application: a contract for service (already a pretty strange 
characterization of her "consent") is consistent with the Thirteenth Amendment only if 
the contractor "can elect at any time to break it, and no law or force compels performance 
or a continuance of the service."
31
  Consent to the servitude is simply irrelevant. 
 
B.  Equality 
 
 The Thirteenth Amendment is also concerned about the subordination of groups.  
It is egalitarian as well as libertarian. 
 This concern about invidious social meanings is most evident in the Court's 
interpretation of the second section of the amendment, which provides that "Congress 
shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation."  This provision, the 
Court has held, "authorizes Congress not only to outlaw all forms of slavery and 
involuntary servitude but also to eradicate the last vestiges and incidents of a society half 
slave and half free . . ."
32
  On the basis of this interpretation, the Court in Jones v. Alfred 
H. Mayer Co. sustained Congress' authority to outlaw private racial discrimination:  
                                                 
29
 This premise is dubious in several different ways.  Lifelong sexual abstinence is not a reasonable option 
for most people, so their decision to decline that option does not imply consent to anything in particular.  
Many women lack power in their relationships with specific men.  Pressures to have sex are often 
accompanied by pressures not to use contraception.  See Forced Labor, 84 Nw. U. L. Rev. at 503-05. 
30
 Id. at 242.  Accord Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207 (1905); United States v. Reynolds, 235 U.S. 133 
(1914); Taylor v. Georgia, 315 U.S. 25 (1942); Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4 (1944).  Cf. Peonage Cases, 
123 F. 671, 680 (M.D. Ala. 1903):  "In the legal sense, whatever they may be in other aspects, such 
agreements are involuntary in their inception, since the law forbids consent, and therefore treats the 
agreement as having been made involuntarily -- against the will."  
31
 Clyatt, 197 U.S. at 215-16. 
32
 Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 441 n.78 (1968). 
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"Congress has the power under the Thirteenth Amendment to determine what are the 
badges and incidents of slavery, and the authority to translate that determination into 
effective legislation."
33
  Tribe thinks that this language, if read literally, grants to 
Congress a power to protect individual rights "which is as open-ended as its power to 
regulate interstate commerce."
34
  But unlike the Thirteenth Amendment, the commerce 
clause does not specify the evil which Congress is empowered to eliminate.
35
  If the 
Thirteenth Amendment authorizes Congress to eradicate the badges of slavery -- even 
those which, as in Jones, do not directly impose involuntary servitude -- this can only be 
because they, too, are among the evils that the amendment forbids. 
 Why should this be so?  Why is it that "the freedom that Congress is empowered 
to secure under the Thirteenth Amendment includes the freedom to buy whatever a white 
man can buy, the right to live wherever a white man can live"?
36
  The explanation seems 
to rest on complex nature of slavery as an institution: 
 Although "slavery" as an abstract form does not encompass mere 
discrimination in the sale of housing, the attention of the congressmen in 
1864 and 1865 was not directed simply at an abstract model of slavery, but 
at a particular instance of that evil which existed in the South.  Having 
flourished for over a century, southern slavery had built up strong interests 
among those who depended upon it and ingrained habits and attitudes in 
men of both races.  It involved a complex of social and economic as well 
as legal relationships. . . . [The Thirteenth Amendment] appears to have 
been designed as a full response to the evil perceived.  As modern 




Even when slavery is deprived of legal sanction, its imprint on society is not yet wiped 
out.  "[W]hen racial discrimination herds men into ghettos and makes their ability to buy 
property turn on the color of their skin, then it too is a relic of slavery."
38
   
 The concern about invidious meaning is equally present in the abortion case.  
 If indeed "[t]here can be no doubt that our Nation has had a long and unfortunate 
history of sex discrimination,"
39
 this discrimination has consisted primarily of the 
systematic use of motherhood to define and limit women's social, economic, and political 
capacities.  Anti-abortion laws would continue and ratify that practice even if they could 
                                                 
33
  Id. at 440. 
34
  Laurence Tribe, American Constitutional Law, § 5-13 at 332 (2nd ed. 1988). 
35
  See U.S. Const.
several States . . . ."). 
36
  Jones, 392 U.S. at 443. 
37
  Note, The "New" Thirteenth Amendment:  A Preliminary Analysis, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 1294, 1301-02 
(1969). 
38
  Jones, 392 U.S. at 442-43. 
39
  Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973) (plurality opinion). 
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somehow be restricted to that small subset of women seeking abortions who had 
contracted not to do so.  The issue here is analogous to that of "badges of slavery."  
Because the subordination of women, like that of blacks, has traditionally been reinforced 
by a complex pattern of symbols and practices, the amendment's prohibition extends to 
those symbols and practices. 
 While the Court reversed Bailey's conviction "[w]ithout imputing any actual 
motive to oppress,"
40
 and invidious intent is thus not a part of the burden a Thirteenth 
Amendment challenge to a statute must carry, the pervasive presence of such intent 
strengthens such a challenge by reinforcing the suspicion that the statute would ratify 
systematic oppression.  Sexism is as pervasive in the anti-abortion world view as racism 
was in the Southern peonage system.  Just as southern whites typically assumed that 
blacks were lazy and irresponsible, anti-abortion arguments in contemporary America 
typically belittle women's capacity for moral agency, often supposing that women who 
abort simply don't and can't understand what they are doing.
41
  Just as the white 
landowners tended to think that agricultural labor, whether forced or willing, was a 
suitable role for blacks, so opponents of abortion tend to think that motherhood, whether 
forced or willing, is a suitable role for women.  The view that dismisses a woman's desire 
to control the course of her life as arising from "convenience, whim, or caprice"
42
 is 
intimately linked to the traditional view that it is ridiculous and inappropriate for women 
to have or pursue such desires, and that the capacities of women, but not of men, are 
properly exercised "not for self-development, but for self-renunciation."
43
  Laws against 
abortion place the state's imprimatur on that view by imposing criminal punishment on 
those who deviate from it.  In both cases, the insult is the same:  to the extent that either 
                                                 
40
  219 U.S. at 244.  Cf. Reynolds, 235 U.S. at 148-49 ("The validity of this system of state laws must be 
judged by its operation and effect upon rights secured by the Constitution . . . ."); Taylor, 315 U.S. at 29 
(focusing upon statute's "effect" and "necessary consequence"); Pollock, 322 U.S. at 25 ("We impute to the 
legislature no intention to oppress . . . ."). 
41
 This lamentable tendency recently resurfaced in Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in Gonzales v. 
Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 159 (2007), which held that abortion methods may be restricted because "some 
women come to regret their choice to abort the infant life they once created and sustained," possibly 
resulting in "[s]evere depression and loss of esteem."  Justice Ginsburg responded by citing peer-reviewed 
studies showing that women who abort show no higher rate of psychiatric disorder than those who carry 
pregnancy to term.  Id. at 183-84 (Ginsburg, J, dissenting).  Kennedy admitted that he had "no reliable data 
to measure the phenomenon," but deemed it "unexceptionable" that this story is true of "some women."  Id. 
at 159 (majority opinion).  It is hard to imagine any limits to the proposition that constitutional liberties can 
be restricted if it sometimes happens that someone regrets exercising the liberty in a given way.  Some 
people who criticize actions of the government later wish that they had kept their mouths shut.  Some 
criminal suspects regret that they didn't confess everything when the police first interrogated them.  Some 
of the slaves freed by the Thirteenth Amendment were old and infirm, and some of them probably regretted 
leaving the plantation. 
42
  Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 221 (1973) (White, J., dissenting). 
43
  John Ruskin, Of Queen's Gardens, in Sesame and Lilies 86 (1910; Harold Bloom ed. 1983).  Pro-life 
activists tend to believe that "men are best suited to the public world of work, and women are best suited to 
rear children, manage homes, and love and care for husbands."  Kristin Luker, Abortion and the Politics of 
Motherhood 160 (1984). Cf. Faye Ginsburg, Contested Lives:  The Abortion Debate in an American 
Community (1989). 
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blacks or women are regarded as instruments for satisfying the needs of others rather than 
as autonomous agents, their dignity as free persons is violated.  They are treated as things 
rather than as persons. 
 
C.  Bringing the strands together 
 
 The injury of compulsory pregnancy, in sum, has both individual and social 
aspects:  forced pregnancy is a deprivation of individual liberty, but that deprivation is 
selectively imposed on women -- and women are a group that has traditionally been 
regarded as a servant caste, whose powers (unlike those of men) are properly directed to 
the benefit of others rather than themselves.  Compulsory motherhood deprives women of 
both liberty and equality.  And the Thirteenth Amendment argument responds to both of 
these injuries. 
 The Thirteenth Amendment is both libertarian and egalitarian, because the 
paradigmatic violation deprives its victims of both liberty and equality.  It compels some 
private individuals to serve others, and it does so as part of a larger societal pattern of 
imposing such servitude on a particular caste of persons.  If the libertarian and egalitarian 
rules of decision are both plausible readings of the amendment, it is because each stresses 
one undeniable aspect of the paradigmatic case.  The courts may invalidate laws that 
impose servitude only on individuals, as it said it was doing in Bailey, and Congress may 
outlaw practices that stigmatize, but do no more than stigmatize, traditionally subjugated 
groups, as in Jones.  But if either of these cases were paradigmatic of the amendment's 
prohibition, the other would be inexplicable.  While the amendment has been construed 
broadly to encompass both these injuries, each involves only one of the two main aspects 
of what the amendment forbids.  Compulsory pregnancy involves both.  Since the 
amendment reaches far enough to forbid either of these injuries standing alone, a fortiori 
it forbids laws that inflict both of them at once. 
 The argument thus stated is thus open to a number of objections, 
counterexamples, qualifications, and questions of application.  These are addressed in 
detail in the original article, and I will not repeat these points here. 
 
II.  The argument revisited 
 
Plato’s Socrates famously noted the limitation of any written argument, that “once 
a thing is put in writing, the composition, whatever it may be, drifts all over the place, 
getting into the hands not only of those who understand it, but equally of those who have 
no business with it; it doesn’t know how to address the right people, and not address the 
wrong.  And when it is ill-treated and unfairly abused it always needs its parent to come 
to its help, being unable to defend or help itself.”44  How well has my offspring managed 
in the world since I sent it on its way? 
 
A.  Its reception 
 
                                                 
44
 Phaedrus, 275d-e, tr. R. Hackforth. 
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 The article has been cited exactly once by a court, as evidence for the proposition 
that a defense of abortion based on the Thirteenth Amendment was not frivolous.
45
  That 
court pointedly noted that it was not expressing a view on the merits.
46
   
 In the law reviews, it has been cited 83 times.
47
  Most of these citations are 
friendly but brief, sometimes amounting to boilerplate, and do not engage the argument.  
It has elicited strong objections from three major legal scholars.  Judge Richard Posner, 
describing Roe as “the Wandering Jew of constitutional law,” noted that commentators 
have tried to “squeeze” the decision into many different constitutional provisions, 
including the Thirteenth Amendment.  He was dismissive of all such efforts:  “I await the 
day when someone shovels it into the Takings Clause, or the Republican Form of 
Government Clause (out of which an adventurous judge could excogitate the entire Bill 
of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment), or the Privileges and Immunities Clause. It is 
. . . a desperate search for an adequate textual home, and it has failed.”48  Steven D. Smith 
described the article as an “ingenious discovery of legal and moral content in a 
constitutional text beyond what its authors could have contemplated,” but then rejected it 
as a “hatrabbit operation.”49  Neither deems it necessary to explain why the argument is 
unpersuasive.  John McGinnis has offered the fullest and most thoughtful response that 
has yet been published, albeit packed into a few sentences: 
It is not only that no reasonable person at the time would have thought that 
unwanted pregnancy was a form of involuntary servitude. Even now such an 
argument would be treated at best as a pun on labor rather than seriously 
advanced in a court of law. Servitude, particularly as the context of an amendment 
that was designed to end slavery relates to economic obligation, not familial 
obligations. Unwanted pregnancy is no more involuntary servitude than are the 
other unwanted obligations that may force parents to work for their children, like 
child support. In fact it is less so because these other obligations may trigger 
imprisonment if they are not kept. But even assuming the alternative universe in 
which a Court would apply this clause to the issue of abortion, Professor 
Koppelman still must make broad political assertions about the subordination of 
women to counter the obvious point that at least some women voluntarily become 
pregnant and then, changing their mind, wish to terminate a pregnancy.
50
 
                                                 
45
 Jane L. v. Bangerter, 61 F.3d 1505, 1515 n.9 (10
th
 Cir. 1995) 
46
 Id. at 1515.  It was reversing lower court decisions that had cast scorn on the argument; though those 
courts did reach the merits, they did so summarily, with little argument.  Jane L. v. Bangerter, 828 F.Supp. 
1544, 1554-55 (D. Utah 1993); Jane L. v. Bangerter, 797 F.Supp. 1537, 1548-49 (D. Utah 1992). 
47
 A Westlaw search of Koppelman /2 “Forced Labor” in the JLR (journals and law reviews) database on 
April 15, 2009 yielded a list of 88 citations, which I corrected by deleting five articles written by myself. 
48
 Richard Posner, Legal Reasoning From the Top Down and From the Bottom Up:  The Question of 
Unenumerated Constitutional Rights, 59 U. Chi. L. Rev. 433, 442 n. 29 (1992). 
 
49
 Steven D. Smith, Idolatry in Constitutional Interpretation, 79 Va. L. Rev. 583, n 130 (1993). 
50
 John O. McGinnis, Decentralizing Constitutional Provisions Versus Judicial Oligarchy:  A Reply to 
Professor Koppelman, 20 Const. Commentary 39, 56 (2003). 
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McGinnis challenges the thesis on three different grounds:  original intent, an analogy 
with family obligations, and an argument about the force of obligations voluntarily 
undertaken.  But these arguments were already raised and answered in the original article.  
Specific original intent proves too much, since the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment 
supported segregated schools and miscegenation prohibitions.
51
  Child support 
obligations do not raise Thirteenth Amendment concerns because they do not require 
specific bodily labor from anyone; one can raise the money any way one likes, just like 
any other contractual obligation.  The Bailey decision did not relieve Bailey of his debt.
52
  
And obligations voluntarily undertaken were precisely what was at issue in Bailey.
53
 
Perhaps you, reading this right now, don’t buy the argument.  If so, I wish you 
would write to me and explain why.  If there is a defect in the argument, no one has ever 
stated it in print.  Hit me.  I want you to. 
  
B.  Its philosophical limitations 
 
The largest problem with the argument, as I presented it, is that it understates the 
messiness of the abortion issue, and offers too clean a resolution.  The article has some of 
the typical vices of a young person’s work:  its view of the world is too simple, and it 
doesn’t acknowledge frankly enough the complexity of the issues it takes on. 
The boundaries of moral concern are mysterious.  No conclusive philosophical 
account has been offered of where those boundaries are appropriately located.
54
  It is a 
matter of common agreement that late-term abortions are far more morally troubling than 
early ones, and that infanticide is absolutely prohibited.  It is far less clear why this is the 
case.  It is not just that there is no clean, knock down way to resolve the issue of the 
fetus’s personhood.  There is also no clarity about how, as a practical matter, we as a 
society ought to address these borderlines of status. If the fetus’s personhood is conceded 
for the sake of argument, there is no way to prove that it does not outweigh the Thirteenth 
Amendment claim.  The article’s claims were too strong in this regard.55   
                                                 
51
 Forced Labor, 84 Nw. U. L. Rev. at 488-89 n.40. 
52
 Id. at 523. 
53
 Id. at 490-511; for a summary of that argument, see Part IA supra.  In fairness to Prof. McGinnis, he was 
only responding to the Thirteenth Amendment argument in passing, while conducting a dispute that was 
primarily concerned with very different issues.  See Andrew Koppelman, How “Decentralization” 




 See Kent Greenawalt, Religious Convictions and Political Choice 98-172 (1988); Jeffrey McMahan, 
Cognitive Disability, Misfortune, and Justice, 25 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 3 (1996). 
55
 This obvious issue is only glancingly addressed in the original article.  In fact, it’s buried inside footnote 
155 on pp. 516-17.  This is reminiscent of Robert Nozick’s description of a certain kind of bad philosophy 
as  
pushing and shoving things to fit into some fixed perimeter of specified shape.  All those things 
are lying out there, and they must be fit in.  You push and shove the material into the rigid area 
getting it into the boundary on one side, and it bulges out on another.  You run around and press 
the protruding bulge, producing yet another in another place.  So you push and shove and clip off 
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 The argument from precedent was similarly too neat.  I argued that, given that no 
one could prove the personhood of the fetus, it was impossible to say that Roe is clearly 
wrong, so it should remain the law.  That’s not clear either, because the moral status of a 
fetus is so uncertain. 
 What can be shown here is that prohibitions of abortion implicate a constitutional 
right of great weight, one for which many lives have been sacrificed in the past.  This 
diminishes but does not eliminate the problem of judge-made law.  The precedents on 
which I rely are firmly rooted in the text, and no one seriously questions their validity. 
 If the claim is thus modified, then it becomes possible to answer the most difficult 
objection from precedent, one that I addressed too cavalierly in the original article.  
Parents have a legal duty to render assistance to their children, and can be criminally 
prosecuted if they do not.  This duty has never been thought to raise a Thirteenth 
Amendment issue.  But the prohibition of abortion is just an instance of that very duty:  
the pregnant woman is obligated by law to render needed assistance to her child. 
 In the article, I tried to answer this objection by arguing that even the obligations 
of parents would raise a Thirteenth Amendment problem if the parents were not 
permitted to give their children up for adoption, as in fact they are in every state.
56
  I am 
no longer so certain.  Just as we have no conclusive account of the boundaries of moral 
concern, so we have no conclusive account of the nature and extent of parental 
obligations to children.  I am sure, however, that the opposite claim, that parental 
obligations never raise a Thirteenth Amendment issue, is false.  The existence of valid 
parental duties complicates but does not defeat the Thirteenth Amendment argument for 
abortion rights. 
 In the first place, the Thirteenth Amendment case against abortion restrictions 
rests on more than an analogy.  Take another look at the institution of antebellum slavery 
which the amendment was specifically intended to outlaw.  Thus far, in considering what 
"servitude" means, we have only compared forced childbearing with long days of hard 
work in the cotton fields.  But mandatory motherhood and loss of control over one's 
reproductive capacities were partially constitutive of slavery for most black women of 
childbearing age, whose principal utility to the slaveholding class lay in their ability to 
reproduce the labor force.
57
  Unlike (unmarried) white women, they had no right even in 
theory to avoid pregnancy through abstinence; they were often raped with impunity, by 
their masters and others.
58
  Emancipation was intended to free them from such 
indignities.  The effect of abortion prohibitions (whose impact, by the way, has been felt 
                                                                                                                                                 
corners from the things so they’ll fit and you press in until finally almost everything sits unstably 
more or less in there; what doesn’t gets heaved far away so that it won’t be noticed. 
Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia xiii (1974).   
 
56
 See Forced Labor, 84 Nw. U. L. Rev. at 523. 
57
  See Herbert Gutman, The Black Family in Slavery and Freedom, 1750-1925 75-80 (1976). 
58
  See John D'Emilio & Estelle Freedman, Intimate Matters:  A History of Sexuality in America 100-04 
(1988); E. Genovese, Roll, Jordan, Roll:  The World the Slaves Made 413-31 (1976). 
 15 
mainly by poor women who are disproportionately black)
59
 is thus to consign women to a 
kind of servitude from which the amendment was supposed to free them. 
 The most pertinent characteristic of slave mothers was that they were unable to 
refuse intercourse.  But if they had a valid Thirteenth Amendment claim for this reason, 
then so does any woman who is impregnated as a result of a rape.  So the Thirteenth 
Amendment is relevant to at least a subset of abortion cases.  How much further does it 
extend?  That would seem to depend on how voluntary pregnancy is in the full range of 
other cases.  We are back to all the familiar questions of whether a woman who became 
pregnant after making reasonable efforts to contracept, or a woman too young to be 
legally competent, has become pregnant voluntarily.  The Thirteenth Amendment is at 
least relevant to these questions.  That rebuts the claim that it has no application at all to 
parental obligations. 
 
C.  Its rhetorical limitations 
 
 Why didn’t the piece have more impact?  The Thirteenth Amendment is an 
unfamiliar idiom.  People aren’t used to thinking in those terms.  Katherine A. Taylor 
thus observed: 
While feminist theorists have increasingly taken the intriguing approach of 
challenging abortion restrictions and other coercions of pregnant women as 
violating the Thirteenth Amendment, equal protection doctrine arguably affords 
the most appropriate means of challenging statutes that perpetuate women's 
subordinative status, since “it is the only body of constitutional jurisprudence 
explicitly skeptical about the rationality of gender-based judgments and 
specifically concerned with the justice of gender-based impositions.” Thus, it is 
likely that courts will be more amenable to a (revised) equal protection challenge 
to the pregnancy restrictions than to a Thirteenth Amendment challenge.
60
 
The bounds of legitimate legal argument are not set by rules, but by custom and 
usage.  At the time the article was written, not much had been done with the Thirteenth 
Amendment by anyone in the legal academy.  It had been a potent source of law as 
recently as the 1970s, but it had since gone out of fashion, and arguments that tried to 
invoke it as a major premise tended to be ruled out of order without a hearing, simply 
because that kind of thing is not done.
61
  This book indicates that that is changing.  There 
                                                 
59
  See Brief of Amici National Council of Negro Women, et al., Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 
492 U.S. 490 (1989) (No. 88-605), and sources cited therein.  Black women are also under unusually great 
pressure to keep and raise their babies, since black babies are relatively unlikely to be adopted.  See supra 
note 23. 
60
 Katherine A. Taylor, Compelling Pregnancy at Death’s Door, 85 Colum. J. Gender & L. 85, 146 n. 198 
(1997), quoting Reva Siegel, Reasoning From the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation 
and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 Stan. L. Rev. 261, 352 (1992). 
61
 Thus Larry Kramer observed that even those who offer Thirteenth Amendment arguments “tend to 
present their ideas somewhat sheepishly, as if slightly embarrassed to offer something so radically at odds 
with traditional constitutional understandings.” Popular Constitutionalism, Circa 2004, 92 Calif. L. Rev. 
959, 979 (2004). I don’t think he was talking about me, since my argument was fairly immune to 
embarrassment, but the tendency he describes cannot be gainsaid.  His description of the reaction is deadly 
accurate:  “Most other commentators, in the meantime, not to mention lawyers, judges, and politicians, 
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is an increasing appreciation that the Thirteenth Amendment has potent contemporary 
applications. 
 The abortion issue is not going to be resolved by technical legal argumentation.  
But lawyers’ bad consciences about the poor craftsmanship of Roe has certainly played a 
role in the debate.  The Thirteenth Amendment argument can set that at rest.  That counts 
for something. 
 As Thirteenth Amendment arguments become more familiar, the Thirteenth 
Amendment case for abortion will become less surprising.  At that point, legal argument 
may once again come into its own, and scholars and judges may once more feel the 
obligation to answer legal arguments with arguments of their own.  The Thirteenth 
Amendment may again become part of our constitutional conscience.  After twenty years, 
I hope the conversation can begin. 
                                                                                                                                                 
dismiss these musings as academic flights of fancy--the kinds of things only law professors, unconnected to 
reality, would think worth pursuing.” Id.  This reaction illustrates his more general point that “problems 
come to us framed by a multitude of implicit understandings and assumptions that limit and shape how we 
reason by defining our sense of how things work.”  Id. at 980. 
 Thanks to Ron Allen for comments, and to Marcia Lehr for research assistance. 
